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and

JEFFREY H. MOORE
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University

ABSTRACT
Without exaggeration the basic challenge of management is

economics:

how to choose to employ scarce productive

It is
resources to accomplish limited objectives effectively.
well recognized today, and increasingly so in post-industrial
societies, that information, broadly defined, is a strategic

economic resource that must be managed if it is to be
productive.

A comprehensive literature has developed .in the

discipline of economics which concerns information,
information systems and information-related phenomena of
import to management and the development of management
information systems (MIS). Although this literature is vast,
this overview attempts to relate some of this work to MIS and
MIS research. We highlight results in three general areas:
1) those which concern the effect of information upon economic
issues
2) those which concern
markets external to the firm;
of information and its relation to decision making and the
internal organization of the firm; and 3) those which concern
questions of allocation and control of information resources
within the firm.
In particular, attention will be directed to
interpretation of the major results related to the effect of
information upon markets and upon individual decision making,
team theory, agency theory, decomposition theory, resource

allocation and pricing,

incentives, and information

evaluation.
to

INTRODUCTION

the

firm;

2)

those which concern

issues of information and its relation to
decision making and the internal

Although the now classic MIS research

and 3)

those

article by Mason and Mitroff (58)
highlighted the importance of

organization of the firm;

understanding both behavioralist and

control of information resources within
Although the relevant economics
the firm.
literature encompassed by these three

rational-economic

viewpoints

in

which concern questions of allocation and

the

conduct of MIS research, there has been

areas

considerably more emphasis on the former
in current work.
However, the MIS
researcher interested in economic issues

is

vast,

we

will

attempt

to

highlight some of the salient results
relevant

to

MIS

researchers

and

practitioners attempting to integrate
these aspects of economic theory into

is faced with a vast amount of published
research by economists in a bewildering
In an attempt to
number of topical areas.
rectify the problem, this paper examines

Necessarily,
their thinking about MIS.
commentary will be brief and interested

readers are referred to the articles

some of the major themes in economics
which we believe are not only relevant to
scholars interested in MIS research, but

listed in the bibliography to obtain
better understanding of the mathematical

understanding economic issues and their

areas.

also to practitioners interested in

application to MIS.

models employed by economists in these

Our presentation will

The paper is organized as follows.

center on results in three general areas:
1) those which concern the effect of

After providing some background material,
attention is directed to the first general

information upon economic markets external
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non-technical, but abstruse, book is full

area, namely the effect of information on
exchange

economies

economies.

and

of economic ideas useful for theories of
In particular, Arrow develops

production

MIS.

This is followed under the

analogies between information channels and
managerial decision making by considering

second general area by consideration of
the economics of information applied to
individual

firm,

decision

an information system as a form of channel

making within the

which is then extended

to

involving irreversible managerial

the

investment in its.development and whose

multi-person case under the topic of
organizational

intended use is in the context of highly

Within

design.

He conjectured that in

organizational design, consideration is

uncertain payoffs.

given to team theory and a variation of it

such a context the private incentive of

known as decomposition theory.

decision

makers to invest in new
"channels" may be very low relative to the
potential organization-wide benefits of
If one considers an MIS
its deployment.

The second

general area concludes with a summary of

relevant game theoretic models and their
implications for MIS research.
Finally,
the third general area focuses upon

to be

a kind of

"channel" the analogy is

pricing and incentive issues in allocating

quite suggestive of further MIS reserach

and controlling formalized MIS services
within the firm.

ideas.
A useful non-technical framework for
examining the relationship of information

to economic decision making is found in

BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate

This surprisingly
Marschak (55).
prophetic article first identified

recent

application to MIS one must first

societal trends toward the "knowledge
in
a
economy"
and
devel oped

have clear understanding of the framework
embedded in the traditional competitive

associated with the information economics

research in the economics

and its

market

model

at

of

the

information

level

of

straightforward way the jargon frequently

area. Indeed, much of today's research in
economics of information can be traced to

an

intermediate micro-economics text.
Although many textbooks would qualify as
background reading in this area, a very
useful and appealing presentation is given
in the first few chapters of Sharpe (80)·
This text summarizes much of conventional
micro-economic theory and gives an
interesting application of it to the
economics of computers.
Unfortunately,
much of the data on computers utilized in

the pioneering work by Marschak in this

this text is dated.

decision making in economic contexts with
the use of alternative information systems

Another

framework

important

and other articles by him (52, 53, 54, and

57).

Readers interested in a useful
discussion of some of these fundamental
economic issues,

computer related problem, are referred to

Emery (25). Finally, a theme of research
involving empirical study of mamagerial
is summarized in Dickson et.

in

understanding the economics of information

This collection of studies
simple ideas related to
information can be useful
MIS research themes in this

is provided by what has come to be called

"communications theory", based upon the
Useful
notions related to information encoding

pioneering work of Shannon (79).

and channel capacity are presented there.
Although communications theory per se has

EFFECT

not had significant impact uponm research
themes in the economics of information,
information

content

literature

is

Shannon-oriented theories ignore

the crucial value-of-information question
by tacitly assuming that all.information

involves

models

of

a

explicitly

treated

endogenously.

examine the effect of information upon
efficiency and allocation issues within

an

the

unduly restrictive assumption.
While this
might be useful for the engineering design

traditional competitive market
One example of this is found

framework.
in

of reliable and efficient communication

Ackerloff

(1)

who

examined

the

misallocations that can occur when sellers
and buyers have differential information

channels, it remained for Arrow (7) to
extract meaningful interpretations of it

about

in the context of decision-making economic
organizations.

ECONOMIC

often
Although these models are
mathematically complex, the underlying
motivations are quite straightforward: to

design originated with this work.

theorypand

UPON

competitive economy in which information

a given level of reliability.
Much of the
terminology associated with communications

is equal-valued to the decision maker,

INFORMATION

(20).

An ongoing theme in current economics

and

methods of encoding information to achieve

However,

OF

al

shows how some
economics of
in developing
area.

MARKETS

Shannon's ideas embodied the first attempt
to quantify

applied specifically to a

the

"quality"

of

products.

In

particular, he demonstrates the Pareto

This

inferior movements that are made in a
20

1

better off in terms of their expected

competitive economy when buyers have

wealth after revelation of the public

incomplete information, concerning the
In this

true state of traded commodities.

In addition, because most of

information.

these results depend critically on the

case a Pareto inferior movement means that
is worse

assumption of homogeneity of traders'
prior beliefs (prior to the revelation of

In the context of "pure exchange"
economies in which no production of goods

define the assumptions relevant to how
information affects decision making.

occurs, considerable research has been
directed at the impact of the information
on market equilibria. Development of the
theory can be found in, for example,

ancillary development in these models of
the distinction between the private and

at least one person,

the buyer,

off after the trade than before.

information), one must very carefully

Hirshleifer

(37) and Ng

(66).

More important to MIS research, is the

underlying

theme

is

in

that

value

social

Marshall

of

Both

information.

Hirshleifer and Marshall emphasize this

(57) provides a good summary of this
research.
Although models differ, the

It can be shown in these
distinction.
models that even though the public

a

of

revelation

State-preference model of a pure exchange

is

information

socially

valueless, there is nevertheless an

economy the public revelation of
information, even if costlessly obtained,

expected gain ex ante to an individual

is at best socially valueless. While this
may seem surprising, the underlying
rationale is reasonably clear:
under a

privately.

linited definition of social welfare,

single self-serving individual could

involving consideration of Pareto superior

obtain benefit

wishing to acquire the same information
That is, there is no value to

publicly releasing the information, but a
the

if information is publicly disclosed about

informational advantage to condition his
trading prior to everyone else learning

uncertain future or otherwise unobservable

same

from privately acquiring

movement in the competitive equilibrium,

it.

clear;

were

effected

prior

to

using

this

The insidiousness of this result is

"states of the world" prior to trading,

then at least one trader Will be made
strictly worse off than he would be if
trades

information and

if there is private gain to a

trader by.acquiring information, then all
traders will invest in information systems

the

uncertain future state but without the

to obtain signals about uncertain but

information.

relevant states of the world.

Moveover,

those

(rare)

However,

if

situations in which public information is
released yielding a net (windfall) gain to

everyone obtains this information then it
becomes "public" and therefore at best no

all traders occur on17 in the economically
uninteresting case in which no change in

loser from excessive investments in MIS.

t r a d i n g
o c c u r s
over
t h e
Since public
no-public-information case.

holds

information is never completely costless

markets allowing (risk-adverse) traders to.

to obtain in practice,

hedge

society

is

improvement
It

made

gathering and disseminating the public
informationt

if

there

against

the

are

"insurance"

occurrence

of

of productive technology (no production of
goods is conditional on the information).

that

comparisons

These

of

latter

results

have

direct

implications for MIS in organizations.

"well-offness" among undominated economic
equilibria are not considered.
Public
information is "valuable" only if a Pareto
superior movement

even

traders have the same probability
distributions over states) and the absence

the
with the impact of information;
non-usefulness of public information
result hangs critically on the common
interpersonal

important to note that this result

traders about states of the world (all

impact of information. First, one must be
careful in defining criteria when dealing

economists

society is the

the cost of the information gathering
process itself.
Again, these results
appear to hinge critically upon two
assumptions:
homogeneous beliefs by

While this result may not at first be
considered
relevant to MIS in
organizations, it clearly does highlight
several non-obvious issues related to the

by

and

undesirable states of the world.
If such
hedging is (costlessly) allowed then the
release of potentially adverse information
harms no one (in an ex ante sense), since
everyone is "insured' , but society is out

strictly worse off, even in the windfall
case, because resources must be devoted to

assumption

is

occurs

First,

these models suggest that the

development of MIS in the public sector

for the accumulation and disclosure of
"public information" is not necessarily

in the competitive

That is, if the
equilibrium occurs.
revelation of public information would
make at least one person worse off in his
trading prospects, then the information is
considered socially harmful by economists

which has much broader implications for

even if many other traders would be made

MIS;

always desirable, at least under the
restrictive Pareto dominance criteria.

Second, these results highlight a notion

21

namely,

that

there

may

be

in

INFORMATION, DECISION MAKING AND INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION

practice substantial differences in the
private incentives by managers to acquire
additional information for decision making
from

that

which

is

more

broadly or

INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING

socially desirable. The implications for

The

the over investment in MIS are obvious and

impact

of

information

upon

there may be direct parallels between

decision making by a single individual

these results as applied to, for example,
a divisionalized organization in which the

now a common topic in management science
textbooks. Since most management science
textbooks treat topics, such as Bayesian

managers

individual

from their narrow

is

pers pective have incentive to invest
excessively in MIS in light of what is

revision and the expected value of perfect

best

here.

from

overall

information, they will not be surveyed

organizational

However,

useful summaries of this

and related ideas can be found in Marschak

objectives.

(52),

more

Stigler (89) and Arrow (5)·

recent
produced

Discussions of the behavioral impact of
information in economic decision making

counterexamples which challenge the social

uselessness of information result, even in

can be found in Simon (81,82), while an
interesting empirical application of the

the case of pure exchange economies.

impact of information upon economic

On the other
research in this

hand,

area has

Models developed by, for example,
Verrechia (93) and Ohlson (71) focus upon

decision making can be found in Chervany
and Dickson (12).

the homogeneity of beliefs assumption in
Verrecchia has shown,

these early models.

well

Less

known

in

the

individual

for example, that in the context of
"sufficiently heterogeneous" beliefs that
the result does not hold. Moreover, it is

decision making literature and of

economy

Seminal contribution to this
structures.
literature was make by Blackwell (9), but
since it was published in a statistical

commonly

agreed

that

in

an

immediate relevance to MIS researchers is
the work on comparisons of information

involving production, as well as exchange,

in which the revelation of information can

affect not only trades but also productive

journal, its relevance to economics and

opportunities, that public information

MIS went largely unnoticed until recently·

need not be socially valueless· However,
even in this context there are likely to
be differential incentives to acquire

Although not explicitly documented,

information

from what

is

socially

signals.

optimal.

present

In a contrasting vein, Wilson (95)

developes

several

simple

models

as

such, in the information literature. A
concise, readable summary of it is given
discrete
by McGuire (60) for the case of
Marschak and Miyasawa (50)
the full theory with some

extensions, the reading of which requires
considerable mathematical dexterity·

to

illustrate how the acquisition of
information can dramatically affect

Essentially, Blackwell views an

outcomes when production of goods can

information system (structure) as a device
which

occur.
In a novel approach to formulating
models, he demonstrates that under

decision maker.

uncertainty a producer faced with a
constant returns to scale productive
technology could nevertheless through the
acquisition of information exhibit in the
marketplace economies of scale. That is,

In

standard way.

on the observed signal.
to

this

calculate

This is then used

expected

payoff

over

alternative actions, given the observed
signal,

so

as

to

determine

the

payoff

maximizing action given the signal.
Blackwell assumes that the dexision maker
must select one of several alternative
signal generating

somewhat technically,

illustrating

in the

context the function of the information
signal is to modify the decision maker's
unconditional prior probability over which
of the states will obtain by conditioning

and similar models to our understanding
the role of MIS are obvious and this is a
fruitful area for further studies.
Interested readers are also referred to
Hurwicz (38) and Alchian and Demsetz (2)
models

He then incorporates this

into a Savage-rational model of decision
making

information permit the organization to
achieve economies of scale even if the
underlying production technology has no
The implications of this
such economies.

additional

about

"signals"

signalling, via the information system,

the combined affects of production and

who have developed,

produces

unobservable states of the world to a

information

systems

To
before observing the specific signal.
do this the payoffs resulting from the

the

richness with which information can affect

the comparative statics of economic

optimal actions, given the possible

models.

signals that could be generated from each
of the alternative information systems,
are weighted by the decision maker's prior

22

probability of observing the signals in

research into organization design from the

order to compare the relative payoff of
the alternative information structures.

primarily as formalized, impersonal,

This allows the decision maker to rank

seeking

order the information structures according
to the expected payoffs derived from
utilizing them.
Blackwell then goes on to
ask the question

sociologists by viewing organizations

"Under what conditions

which,

goal

under

decentralization, can be parti tioned into
a collection of goal seeking subsystems
The
according to some rules of hierarchy.
thrust

can alternative information structures be
rank ordered without going through the

systems

in

this

research

has

been

to

examine models of such organizations from
a normative perspective so as to, for
example, examine effects of alternative

process of determining payoff maximizing
decisions for each candidate structure7."
In addressing this he develops the notion

hierarchies

upon

the

problem

of

coordinating the interacting subsystems.

of "fineness" of an information structure.

In this more narrow economics arena,
organizational design refers to the

information

application of economic theory in
multi-person organizations in which the
effect of markets, if any, is indirect or

Loosely

speaking,

one

structure

is

(costless)

finer

than

another if the first structure yields a
more precise description of which of the
states will occur than the second.
Not
all information structures can be ranked
by the fineness criterion.

minimal.

Basically, his

should

theorem establishes that one information
structure

is

The operative question is

"What

structures and decision making procedures
be

adopted

in

order

to

make

rational decisions, in some sense, in the

absence of complete markets?".

generally preferred to

Background

another if it can be shown to be finer.

reading in this area can be found in

While

Hirshleifer (34,35,36), Hurwicz (38,39,40)
Advanced
and Arrow and Hurwicz (6).

this is intuitively obvious

(the

finer structure tells you as much and
possibly more about which of a set of
states

has

occurred),

Blackwell's

Theorem

is

the
the

value

treatment of the economics of internal

of

organizations are given by Spence

(88),

Stiglitz (90), and reading in McGuire and

concrete

operationalization of the concepts
In addition, the real practical
employed.
value of Blackwell's Theorem appears to be

mathematical treatment of the
philosophical issues related to the

those situations when it does not apply.

economics of organization design can be

Radner

The MIS implications of this case are
developed

in detail

elsewhere,

(59).

More broad base and less

found in Williamson (94), Grochla and
Szyperski (29), Heal (30), Galbraith (27),

Moore

(64).

and Marschak (56). Most of these authors
attempt to address organizational design

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

from

two

perspectives:

1)

that

of

organizational design as regards

Organizational design refers to the
class of problems in which the

with particular emphasis upon

causally

decentralized environments and 2) resource
allocation in decentralized organizations.

centralization versus decentralization

organizational structure itself is treated
as a controllable variable which is

related

to

specialization

organizational

performance by some criteria.

Although

addressing the 0211211 design of
even

in

Decentralization is of interest to MIS
because in almost all cases authors have
defined decentralization in terms

in the economics

literature, the models which have been
developed in organizational design have
direct and immediate implication

incentives

More will be said about resource
allocation in a subsequent topic.

there has been no definitive work in
organizations

and

critically related to information
economics.
That is, firms are viewed as

for MIS.

Organizational design is a somewhat
confusing rubric, largely because there is
a considerable body of sociological
literature which examines the behaviorally
oriented aspects of the design of
organizations. Useful background reading

making authority is delegated to
subsystems within the organization, there

of this literature is essential if MIS
researchers are to intelligently apply the

the decision made by one subsystem
influences the goal attainment by other

decentralized if discretionary decision
is some degree of informational autonomy

among the subsystems and, finally, that

economics of information models related to
Background reading
on
the
behavioral
aspects
of

subsystems.

organization design.

organizational design can be

found

theories

Organizational

encompass

a

wide

design'

range of

alternatives

from the
somewhat
uninteresting case of a fully centralized

in

Cyert and March (15, 16)·
An extensive
summary of recent work in this area can be

organization,

which

found in Moore

subsystems,

the

organization

(65).

to
in

contains

fully

which

identifiable

subsystems do not interact.

Economists have differentiated their

no

separable

The interest

in these models from an MIS perspective
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necessarily identify quite concretely the
nature of the information flows,
distributed computation, managerial

much of the work has been unified in a
An
book by Marschak and Radner (51).
example of an interesting team model would
be one in which agents in a decentralized

incentives and detailed bureaucratic

organization each independently observe,

procedures

via

stems from the fact that these models

as

components

of

the

an

noisy

MIS,

signals

relevant

to

organizational design process. That is,
although the motives of economists have
been to compare organizational designs or

their own economic environment, but the

to address resource allocations, the

information could through cooperation

informational "byproducts" of these models

improve oprganizational payoff over what
each of the agents would genetrate acting
autonomously. The major question in this
case is "What should be observed and what

environments are correlated such that
intelligent

are of considerable interest in developing
theories of normative MIS design which can
stand the test of rigor.
Furthermore,

"sharing"

of

the

observed

(two central

many of these alternativs models have

should be communicated

proven to be sufficiently rich in
structure to capture one or more
observable tenents of actual managerial

questions of any MIS design) in order to
optimally,
in some sense, make
An interesting, if
decisions?".

behavior in organizations, at least as it
pertains to formalized decision making

oversimplified, example of such a team
theory model can be found in Radner (73).

For example, versions of
these models can not only illustrate but

value

demonstrate the optimality of the need for
increased communication as organizations
with high interaction among subsystems

communication among agents, partitioned

procedures.

In this model Radner examined the relative

of s e v e r a l alternative
organizational designs, such as fully
autonomous decision making, complete

messages among various subsystems and the

communication, decision by committee and
All
management by exception cases.
involved alternative information

signals

structures

for

interesting

application

decentralize their decision making.
More
importantly, the exact nature of the
from

the

environment,

as

imputed

in

some

cases.

Although

For

and

of

similar

concepts in team theory to empirical

organizational design models have been
largely ignored by MIS researchers, there
have been many specific models proposed
which are relevant.
convenience alone,

observation

communication in a simple organizational
An
setting for a single time period.

components of the MIS, are operationally
defined and their economic value can be

research can be found in MacCrimmon (49).

e xpository

to

a game theoretic

The mathematical programming approach
organizational design is closely

illustrate cooperative game models, while

related to team theory and is based in
concept on the decomposition of
mathematical programs as representations
of the fundamental decision making problem

a brief discussion of incentive compatible

faced by a decentralized organization.

paradigm

will

be

offered

organizational design.

to

examine

Team theory and

decomposition theory will be used to
models and agency theory will be used to

The approach taken in this literature is

illustrate applications of non-cooperative

to examine alternative ways of breaking
the

overall

problem faced by the

game theory.

down

Team theory was originally developed
by Marschak (53,54). Marschak defines an

organization into a series of smaller
problems whose composite solutions yield
the solution to the overall organizational
problem.

organization to be "a group of persons
whose actions agree with certain rules

MIS interest in this approach is

stimulated

by

the

organizational

that further their common interests" and a

implications drawn from the alternative

team

methods of
precisely,

as

"an

organization

in

which

members have only common interests."

is,

team

theory models

1)

its

That

problem.

eliminate

more
breaking down or,
decomposing the overall

non-cooperative behavior from multi-person

That is, if the overall problem
can be decomposed in alternate ways, each

organization models,

of

concentrating instead

upon the design of communication networks
the

agents

in

a

induces

a

diffe rent

of organizational design is to evaluate

and the specification of decision rules
for

which

organizational structure, then the problem

decentralized

the desirability of one versus another of

organization when scarce resources must be
allocated to competing uses;
2) assume

these decompositions. Again, from an MIS
standpoint these decompositions are of
interest primarily because of the
iterative solution procedure commonly

the goal of the organization is
expressible as a single non-separable
objective function; and, finally, 3)

associated with decomposition models.

assume

environmental

After each iteration information must be

variables affecting outcomes is present.
Example·models incorporating these ideas
can be found in Radner (72,73,74) while

communicated among subordinate agents and

uncertainty

in

between subordinate agents and a superior
in order to begin the next iteration.
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The

analogy between these models and concepts

Zeckhauser

of management control and coordination via

Mirrelees

(3),

Amershi

(87),

(61).

and

Incentives and incentive

compatible control of decentralized
organizations in this context have been

information and communication systems is

obvious.

studied by Groves

Loeb

(30),

(48)

and

Background reading in this area can be
found in Batimol and Fabian (8), Burton and
Obel (11), Ruefli (77) and Jennergren
(41). MIS readers of this literature must

Demski and Feltham (18). The interesting
case of a collection of principals without
necessarily identical tastes who must

be

was

careful

to

see

beyond

the

reach a common decision under uncertainty

narrow

in order to concentrate upon the normative
MIS implications.
A specific example of
how

these

models

can

be

utilized

While there are insights useful for

MIS in examining these models, there would
appear to be numerous areas in which the

to

evaluate alternative information systems
is given by

Freeland and Moore

this model it was

(26).

studied in a seminal study by Wilson

(96).

resources allocative focus of these models

models themselves could be applied in
further understanding MIS related issues.

In

shown that a highly
appealing

For example, the application of agency

information system in which subordinate
agents communicate "bids" for desired
resources can be shown not to work in the

theory of incentive compatibility models

plausible

and

intuitively

to. the

contracting

software

for

development or to the design of MIS
systems themselves fits nicely with the
assumptions commonly employed in these
theories. Extensions of these and similar

sense that the overall organizational
problem would never be solved unless a

richer information system were utilized.

models to the case of the single principal

By richer it is meant that non bid-related
messages must be allowable for the imposed

and multiple agents are currently underway
and could provide a richer context for

coordination to be effective.
An
empirical application of decomposition

modeling information
hierarchical organizatons.

theory to study the effects of alternative
information systems can be found in Moore

(62).

systems

in

ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF INFORMATION
SYSTEMS

Non-cooperative game theory makes the
same assumptions as in team theory except
that the agents do not share a common
goal, thereby inducing non-cooperative
Fundamental background reading
behavior.

Information systems for management, as
well as other environments, require
This fact
investments in resources.

is, of course, von Neumann and Morgenstern

immediately raises questions regarding how

(97).

the use of these resources should be

Although the published literature

allocated and controlled within the firm.
Typically, such questions focus on the
formal information systems in existence or

in non-cooperative games is sizeable, one
segment

of

it,

agency theory,

immediate relevance to MIS.
considers

the

special

is of

Agency theory

case of two,

under consideration and the organizational

or

unit, such as an EDP or MIS department,

possibly more, individuals in which one
individual,

the

principal,

"officially"

hires another

expertise,

to act as his agent in the

not necessarily share the same objectives
range

of

these models

practical

primary

some other.'final purpose of the consumer
For example, an
or principal in the firm.
IS report provides the basis for a

Since it is assumed that the agent does
wide

the

department is an intermediate means to

conduct of some decision making task.
as the principal,

assigned

responsibility for providing information
processing industry, the output of an IS

individual, who possesses technology or

cover a

Thus, it is
management decision.
well-recognized in principle that the

situations.

Furthermore, in most cases the principal

"true costs" of IS are those incurred
indirectly through the realized or lost

is unable to completely be informed about

some aspect of the agent's problem, such

as his utility function or the exact

opportunities of the consumers,

offered by the agent. The goal in agency
theory is often to establish contracts

accounting system in place.

nature of the
which induce

such,

resources or expertise

incentives for the agent to

they

are

"hidden"

and as

from

the

Nonetheless,

control in
into
translates

resource

allocation and

practice

usually

monitoring, estimation and recovery of
Many of these direct costs
direct costs.

act in complete accordance with the
preference of the principal, despite

are relatively fixed (e.g., physical

initially conflicting objectives, or to

equipment and labor), although a number of

devise penalty or sanction schemes to
prevent decision making by the agent which

them do vary with

IS output

and

some

outputs are discretionary (e.g., systems
development).

would not be in the interests of the
principal.
useful references in this area
are given by Ross (75,76), Spence and
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In a series of articles

70) Nolan has

(17,

28,

Under the normal assumptions on
"well-behaved" demand and cost functions,

69,

surveyed contemporary EDP
especially management

the optimal pricing and investment policy
In each
may be characterized as follows,

to control.
For
example, despite recognition that IS is a
support function and the IS department is

produce the amount demanded and set price
equal to marginal variable costs at total

firms EDP costs are allocated as (pure)

clearing price" based on the aggregate

administrative practices by a number of
organizations,

period where capacity is not binding,

policies with regard

The difference (or present value
of the difference) between a "market

a cost center, in some firms EDP is
organized as a profit center;
in other

output.

(inverse) demand function and the marginal
variable cost at a given output level (and
in a given period) can be interpreted as

overhead.
Nolan hypothesizes that the
supply (or availability) of EDP services

in an organization experiences different

the marginal opportunity cost (or value)

and distinct "stages of growth" (28,70) in
response to various characteristics of
user demand and the environment.
To
manage EDP effectively, he advocates that

control policies as reflected by chargeout

of capacity at that output level (and time
When there is slack, this
period).
marginal (opportunity) value is zero· In
each period where capacity is binding, set

systems or resource pricing, should be
flexible and adapt to the conditions of a
given stage· For example, management
might subsidize prices during early growth
and full-cost or monopoly price services

for that period.

total output at capacity and set price
equal to the marginal variable cost at
capacity plus the future worth of the
marginal (opportunity) value of capacity

in excess demand stages to contain

expenditures.
customer

is

where total marginal (opportunity)

Under a chargeout system a
charged

for

service

on

of it is equal to its marginal (purchase)

a

cost over the planning horizon.

job-by-job basis according to some formula
as a function of resources used and unit
prices (e.g., see 42).
Rather

The investment criterion

is to purchase capacity up to the point
value
Some observations are worth nothing on
because the
even this simple case analysis complicated

results in more realistic but

than rely on conventional

models are similar, notwithstanding the

wisdom exclusively, we can productively
consult economic theory for some insight

algebraic details.

First, there is no

price discrimination by user - a desirable

on these issues.
First, given the support
status of the IS department one should

feature.

(Under a profit maximization

criterion

seek an objective which maximizes the net

there

will

be

price

discrimination in favor of users with

discounted value of this group's output
to the firm.
That is, if one measures
this value only as the department's
profits (or the producer's surplus), it is

Second,
greater demand elasticities.)
there is differential pricing to reflect

peak and off-peak demand periods, wherein

peak demand consumers pay a premium.

well-known from economics that the firm
will incur a loss in benefits or welfare

Third, if the operating and investment

surplus"). Thus value should be measured
as the sum of the producer and consumer
surplus.
A second consideration at the

costs equal average costs and the cited
decision rules will recover total costs·

outset

More
generally, however, the cost functions
would be non-linear which means that the
optimal policy is for the firm to
subsidize IS use.
If operating costs are
a pseudo-concave function of output, a

(what economist's call "consumers:

cost functions are linear, then marginal

Note in this instance that the total
investment cost is recovered from the

is whether or not the IS department

is a monopoly in providing services or if

peak-demand period users only.

organizational customers have access to
external suppliers.
Typically, in most
large organizations the monopoly situation

(or a variant on it)

exceptions

being

capabiblties,

prevails with

made

such

as

for

unique

access

to

dynamic version of the basic model yields

a

relative to capacity marginal costs are

How should services be priced?

significantly below average cost and users

The

answer to this question depends on how

are heavily subsidized.

much of the real world complexity one
wishes to capture in a model of the

expands, marginal and
converge, and the amount
At the point
reduces.
costs equal and/or exceed

environment

(44, 45,

67,

68,

83-86).

For

example, consider the simplest of worlds
horizon

over

discrete

As

output

(use)

average costs
of the subsidy
where marginal
average costs,

it is optimal for the firm to expand

in which we have a single productive
resource, a single output, a known,
planning

At low output

the following behavior:

commercial databank.

capacity in order to recapture consumer
surplus -- returning to the high subsidy
situation.

fixed
time

periods, and known demands in each period.
We wish to determine prices in each period

and how much resource capacity to procure·
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welfare of a given of potential IS output.

The basic model has been generalized
in

(44).

In

that

assumptions are:

analysis,

This
might be price"
viewed for
as the
reservation
the individual's
commodity,

the

heterogeneous resource

*

1.e., he would be willing to pay up to or
If
less than that price and not more.
these reservation prices were public they

capacities by age (or vintage); costs as a
function of system load, capacity and
resource age; resource replacement; and
an infinite planning horizon.

could be

(Rental vs.

within the framework as a special case;

the

duration of time and

individual

production. The analysis also shows that
when it becomes optimal to dispose of a

all of its economic value).

A number of other models have appeared

But for selfish reasons

time impose on other users."

in the economics literature dealing with
pricing

and

in the context of congested service
systems and the cost to users of delays in
receiving service.
He shows that a
"Priority price" should be based on
"marginal delay cost which services at any

to replace all of that resource vintage's
capacity (or equivalently, to "write off„

of

priorities

Dolan (21-23) has investigated this issue

particular resource vintage it is optimal

aspects

set

individuals have no natural inclination to
reveal them and to the contrary, it may be
Can a
in their self-interest to lie.
scheme be designed through which an
individual maximizes his own welfare by
revealing his true "reservation prices7"

resource is actively employed in

various

to

user population.

see also 80). Among the results we obtain
is the determination of a natural planning
subhorizon which is finite and corresponds
to

used

allocate output, since in the aggregate
they constitute the "true value" to the

purchase decisions are also included

al. (32)

for the

have

also

Harris,

et

studied the'general

allocation and control of information
services in computers - communications

problem in the presence of asymmetric

Space
networks, (e.g., 19, 24, 78).
limitations preclude a review of this work

(i.e., between users or divisions and the
resource allocating authority or

here.

headquarters).

information and divergent preferences

A review of some of this literature

can be found in Moore (63).

these cases,

as above, the analyses

postulate the existence of user

pricing

demand

There

is

research

reasonably good

schedules

are

optimal

as

a

basis

for

enhanced

organization design.

evidence available in the literature to
support the contention that IS production

and cost functions can be developed,

CONCLUSION

(e.g., 14, 45-47, 80).
There has also
been empirical work done at the industry
and the firm level in identifying and
estimating demand functions, (e.g., 10,
The evidence is somewhat less
13, 14).

Even under the space limitations of
this brief survey, it should be clear that

there is substantial interaction between
MIS and economic theory. The relative
inattention to economic issues related to

satisfactory at the intraorganizational
level for payments or individuals. Some

the impact of information by MIS
researchers is serious.
Although

work has been done by Streeter (91, 92) on
IS demand by "computer-dependent workers; "

behavioral theories related to such things

however, demand by the general consumer

as

(the manager or professional) has not been

studied in any depth.

for a

(cost-minimizing) allocation mechanisms.
In general, these issues merit further

functions and output cost functions (or
equivalently production and expenditures
functions).

They show that

particular (linear) model structure,
certain forms of (rank ordered) transfer

In most of

cognitive

information processing,

implementation of MIS, and management of

One obvious problem

the MIS design process are important to

here is identifiability, since many (if
not most) general consumers are passive
agents in their interactions with IS.

our understanding of this complex topic,
in the final analysis the goal of an MIS
should be improvement in decision making

Another issue concerns the definition and
measurability of IS outputs in general,
i.e., in determining what to include or
exclude.
In the area of MIS we do not

effectiveness.

We

believe

that

incorporation of economic theory into MIS

research should be central to achieving
that goal.

have a convenient metric as a basis for
quantifying output and communicating
requirements.
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INTRODUCTION

both the success with which it performs
its functions and

the interaction between

technology,

original purpose in doing so was to review
the co-evolution of

methodology

individuals

technology and

their

and

user-system,

and

methodological

of

frame

jobs

constitutes

structure

the

of

the assignment of

the

tasks to

jobs constitutes the work structure.

it

became evident that even within a fixed
time

to

organizational

interactions.

the interactions,

in exploring

However,

The individuals

are said to assume jobs which are in turn
The assignment of
comprised of tasks.

Our

information systems.

methodology and

the satisfaction it

derives from doing so.

In this paper we set out to explore

A task,

for our purposes,

is initially

viewed as a black-box transformation

technological advancement there are

important interactions which need to be

which, when triggered,

employs external

inputs and/or internal knowledge, to

understood if information systems are to

successful" and technologically sound.

One can,
of course, decompose tasks into sub-tasks

Thus a second purpose of this paper is to

recursively, assuming that the internal

are, how they impact on an information

some level.

be

developed

which are

produce an output or response.

"user-

both

structure of the task can be determined to

highlight what some of these interactions
systems outcome,

the need

and

for

further

Tasks,

this area.

research in

at a given level of analysis,

can be classified along a number of
To

accomplish

objectives

paper,

in

these

somewhat

dimensions; we elect two:

lofty

short space of

the

this
1.

to erect a simple

it is necessary

system

and

2.

(computer-based)

a

system).

An

support system

information

the

user

Data-oriented v. Non-data-oriented
By

systems

"decomposable" we

intend

a

task

determinable structure. At some point in
the decomposition, we reach a point at

content
which one alters, over time, the
the
and
both

Non-decomposable

which is capable of being decomposed into
labelled sub-tasks; i.e., it possesses a

(DP

methodology is then taken as the means by
of

v.

The device

interactions can be explored.

chosen is to relate the notion of an
information system to two systems: a user
data-processing

Decomposible

(Definable v. Non-definable)

(but expandable) framework by which these

which one can no longer discover sub-tasks

system

(although there may be an underlying "deep

data-processing system so as to introduce

into the organization a "new" information

structure");

system.

decomposable

we

call

task.

this

This

a

non-

invokes

a

is the task definable or
not? This gives rise to the following
labels assignable to a task at any point
in analysis: decomposable (structurable),
sub-criteria:

CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

.non-decomposable-definable (programmable),
non-decomposable-non-definable

USER-SYSTEM
We

take,

as

the

target

development, a user-system.

for

(indeterminate).

IS

A user-system

we define to be one or more individuals

By

co-operating on the accomplishment of one
The

"data-oriented"

potentially

or more functions in an organizaion.
user-system is said to have criteria by

we

processable

existing data-processing

mean

by

data

the

system.

as

then

This

might be data used to trigger the task, to
supply external

which it implicitly or explicitly measures
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input to

it,

to

alter

its

